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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has the highest rate of incarceration in the
world.1  In 2010, one in forty-eight adults were on probation or parole,
and one in 104 adults were in correctional custody.2  Once convicted,
between 70%3 and 89%4 of criminal defendants are sentenced to im-
prisonment.  Since 1986, the number of people imprisoned in the
United States has grown from approximately 746,0005 to more than
2.2 million in 2010.6
These exceedingly high numbers show a trend of increasing impris-
onment, starting in the 1980s.7  Frustrated by the perceived failure of
the criminal justice system, the nation almost completely rejected re-
habilitation as a goal of sentencing.8  Congress passed the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984,9 which implemented determinate sentencing and
excluded rehabilitative goals from a federal judge’s consideration
when imposing a term of imprisonment.10
For a time after Congress passed the Act, the circuits split over
rehabilitative factors being considered after imposing a term of im-
prisonment to influence the judge’s determination of an appropriate
sentence length.11  The U.S. Supreme Court in Tapia v. United States
held that considering rehabilitative factors to determine whether to
1. Entire World—Prison Population Totals, INT’L CENTER FOR PRISON STUD., http://
www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.
php?area=all&category=wb_poptotal (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
2. Lauren E. Glaze, Correctional Population in the United States, 2010, BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT. BULL., Dec. 2011, at 1, 2, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf.
3. Criminal Cases, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=
tp&tid=23 (last updated June 27, 2013).
4. See Fed. Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., http://bjs.
ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (select “Offenders sentenced: ta-
bles”; then “2010”; then “Type of sentence imposed”; then “Display as HTML”).
5. See Corr. Statistics Unit, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Correctional Populations
in the United States, 1996, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., Apr. 1999, at ii, iii,
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpius96.pdf.
6. Glaze, supra note 2, at 3. R
7. China has the second highest number of people imprisoned at 1.6 million, and
Russia has the third highest at 706,000. Entire World—Prison Population
Totals, supra note 1. R
8. See REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
9. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3586 (2006).
10. Id. § 3582(a).
11. See discussion infra section II.D and Part III (discussing the circuit split and its
resolution).
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impose a sentence of imprisonment or the length of that sentence was
impermissible.12
This Note will primarily focus on the policy implications of the
Court’s decision, as well as possible future directions.  In Part II, this
Note will outline the history leading up to the Sentencing Reform Act
and its implementation.  Part II also describes the prior circuit split,
while Part III depicts the Court’s holding in Tapia.13  Part IV of this
Note argues the outcome of the circuit split resolution is beneficial and
necessary because it is both the correct interpretation of the statute
and provides an opportunity for rehabilitation to be redefined by evi-
dence-based principles,14 not presumed as inherent to imprisonment.
Finally, Part V concludes by emphasizing rehabilitation is not a hope-
less aspiration for our criminal justice system if policy implementation
is informed by scientific knowledge from psychological research.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Decline of the Rehabilitative Model
There are four common justifications for punishment: retribution,
incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.15  Each theory has its
own consistent proponents, while its national popularity has vacil-
lated over time.16  Retribution is the oldest theory and is often de-
scribed as the “delivery of justice.”17  Proponents assert it is just to
punish a person who has injured another.18  While this theory is criti-
cized as being retaliatory and, therefore, morally indefensible,19 it
also receives significant support as a means to engender respect for
the law and prevent private citizens from engaging in acts of retalia-
tory violence.20
12. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011).
13. Id.
14. “The usual criterion for classifying a modality as ‘evidence-based’ is that it has
proven superior to a comparable alternative or ‘treatment as usual’ in at least 2
randomized controlled clinical trials conducted by different research groups.”
WILL SPAULDING, NEB. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., BEST PRACTICES 10
(2005).
15. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 36–58 (1968),
reprinted in JAMES VORENBERG, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 40, 40–47 (2d ed.
1981).
16. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5 (4th ed. 2003).
17. See id. § 1.5(a)(6).
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting Ledger Wood, Responsibility and Punishment, 28 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 630, 636 (1938)).
20. Id. (citing JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE 82–83 (1975);
ARTHUR L. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 92–93 (1953)).
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The other three primary theories of punishment are often classi-
fied together as utilitarian justifications.21  Incapacitation justifies so-
ciety imposing imprisonment or execution to defend itself against
future acts of persons who, through their criminal record, have shown
a willingness to injure others.22  This theory is criticized because fu-
ture criminality is difficult to predict accurately and incapacitation is
largely limited,23 as most prisoners will be released eventually.24
There are two types of deterrence: specific and general.25  The ra-
tionale underlying specific deterrence is that exposing a criminal to an
unpleasant experience will deter that criminal from future criminal
behavior.26  Critics attack this theory by citing the high recidivism
rate in our country.27  However, the effect of specific deterrence is im-
measurable; we have no way of knowing what the recidivism rate
would be without punishment.28
General deterrence similarly reasons the public is deterred from
engaging in criminal behavior after observing criminal punishment.29
Critics of this theory claim deterrence is not possible for some crimes30
and punishment is only one of many factors preventing law-abiding
citizens from engaging in criminal conduct.31  Empirical support for
general deterrence is also nearly impossible to establish, as there is no
way to control for all the factors influencing behavior and no compara-
ble group without a system of punishment for criminal behavior.32
For the rehabilitative model, the offender is given treatment in
hopes of reducing recidivism.33  This ideology is less a justification for
punishment, as the objective is not to inflict suffering, and more a the-
ory of behavior modification.34  Major criticisms include that this
21. See PACKER, supra note 15, at 41–47. R
22. LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 1.5. R
23. Id.
24. See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME 3 (2003).  “Ninety-three per-
cent of all prison inmates are eventually released.” Id.
25. LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 1.5(a)(1), (4). R
26. Id. § 1.5(a)(1).
27. For example, of a selection of persons released from prison in 1994, an estimated
67.5% were re-arrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor within three years,
46.9% were reconvicted, and 25.4% were resentenced to prison for a new crime.
Recidivism, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&
tid=17 (last updated June 29, 2013).  This “two-thirds rearrest rate” after three
years has been a consistent finding for more than forty years. PETERSILIA, supra
note 24, at 141. R
28. LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 1.5(a)(1). R
29. Id. § 1.5(a)(4).
30. For example, a rash crime of passion is unlikely to be prevented through
deterrence.
31. LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 1.5(a). R
32. Id. § 1.5(a).
33. Id. § 1.5(a)(3).
34. Id.
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model treats offenders condescendingly by attempting to manipulate
them35 and is not successful overall.36  Critics also assert it risks
great injustice to offenders because effective methods of penal rehabil-
itative treatment are still relatively uncertain and the model requires
they be treated differently based on their perceived needs, rather than
their criminal conduct.37  Proponents assert most management of of-
fenders, even when labeled “rehabilitative,” in actuality is not,38
which likely accounts for its perceived lack of success.39
While each theory had its own proponents, and alternated in pre-
dominance for particular cases,40 rehabilitation was generally favored
for the majority of the twentieth century.41  However, by the 1970s,
the nation had developed growing concerns about the fairness and ef-
fectiveness of rehabilitative priorities.42  Judges had wide discretion
to address rehabilitative needs, which resulted in significant sentenc-
ing disparities that critics perceived as arbitrary and an abuse of state
power.43  With no noted change in recidivism rates,44 the public also
lost confidence in the rehabilitative capacity of the criminal justice
system and “the ability of parole boards and correctional officers to
determine when reformation ha[d] been achieved.”45  This left “the
rehabilitationist rationale . . . and [its sentencing] differences . . . seen
as irrational and indefensible.”46
These concerns laid the groundwork for the sentencing reform
movement of the 1970s, which included changes like sentencing guide-
lines, truth-in-sentencing, mandatory penalties, and a limited role for
parole boards.47  Proponents credit the greater deterrence and inca-
35. Id. (quoting PHILIP BEAN, PUNISHMENT, A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL IN-
QUIRY 194 (1981)).
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting HERBERT L. PACKER, CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, THE PRACTICAL
LIMITS OF DETERRENCE 102, 105 (R. Gerber & P. McAnany eds., 1972)).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 1.5(b) (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (“Retribution
is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law.  Reformation and rehabil-
itation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”)).
But see Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884) (“The great end of punishment is
not the expiation or atonement of the offence committed, but the prevention of
future offences of the same kind.”).
41. LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 1.5(b). R
42. Id. (quoting Martin Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution, 1976 WIS. L. REV.
781 (1976)).
43. Id. (quoting FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 67
(1981)).
44. Recidivism, supra note 27. R
45. LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 1.5(b) (quoting FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE R
REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 73 (1981)).
46. Id. (quoting FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 73
(1981)).
47. PETERSILIA, supra note 24, at 12–13.  These changes vary by jurisdiction. Id. R
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pacitation from these major changes for the recent decreases in crime
rates.48  There undoubtedly has been an increase in incapacitation, as
the number of prisoners in the U.S. has increased by more than 700%,
from about 196,000 in 1970 to 1.4 million in 2001.49
B. Implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act.50  Previ-
ously, the sentencing of an offender involved all three branches of gov-
ernment: Congress set the maximum, the judge set a sentence within
the statutory range, and the parole officials, representing the execu-
tive branch, could change the sentence by allowing an earlier re-
lease.51  One of the major changes of the Act was to transfer the
powers of the judicial and executive branches to the Sentencing Com-
mission the Act created.52
The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints
the Commission’s seven voting members and one nonvoting mem-
ber.53  The Commission was to establish guidelines that reflect the
aim of sentencing as retributivistic, deterrent, incapacitating, and re-
habilitative, and to measure the guidelines’ effectiveness in meeting
those ideals.54  The Act also charged the Commission to promote cer-
tainty and fairness by preventing sentencing disparities, unless justi-
fied by individual factors, and to incorporate “advancement in
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice
process.”55
Within five years, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a constitutional
challenge to the redistribution of power between the branches in Mis-
tretta v. United States.56  The Court held the creation of the Sentenc-
ing Commission was not an excessive delegation of legislative power
because Congress gave more than sufficient guidance to the Commis-
sion in the Act.57  The Court also held it was not a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine because Congress can delegate the task
48. Id. at 13.
49. Id.  Compare the increase in the number of prisoners to the increase in the U.S.
general population, which grew from 203 million in 1970 (ECON. & STATISTICS
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MEASURING AMERICA App. A-1 (2002), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/pol02marv.pdf) to 308 million in
2000 (U.S. Census Bureau Quick Facts, CENSUS.GOV, http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012)).
50. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3586 (2006).  Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989).
51. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364–65.
52. Id. at 367.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
54. Id. § 991(b).
55. Id.
56. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361.
57. Id. at 379.
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of developing Sentencing Guidelines to an expert body within the judi-
cial branch.58
The Act also made all sentencing determinate because it elimi-
nated variance caused by parole boards.59  “A prisoner is to be re-
leased at the completion of his sentence reduced only by any credit
earned by good behavior while in custody.”60  Good behavior credit is
available to inmates serving a sentence longer than a year61 who “dis-
play[ ] exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regula-
tions.”62  These inmates can reduce their sentences by up to fifty-four
days per year.63  The Act also substantially narrowed the range for a
term of imprisonment.  The maximum of the range cannot exceed the
minimum of the range by more than twenty-five percent or six
months, whichever is longer.64
The next major change of the Act was to make the Sentencing
Guidelines binding on federal courts, but it preserved for judges the
ability to depart from the guidelines for a factor the Sentencing Com-
mission did not sufficiently take into account.65  The judge must also
make a statement describing the reasons for the specifics of the sen-
tence and any deviation from the Guidelines.66  The mandatory na-
ture of the Guidelines stood for more than twenty years, until the U.S.
Supreme Court struck it down as unconstitutional under the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury in the 2005 decision United States v.
Booker.67
Both defendants in Booker were convicted by a jury and later sen-
tenced by a judge.68  Booker was convicted of possession with intent to
distribute at least fifty grams of crack cocaine, punishable by 210 to
262 months imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines.69  The
judge, in a sentencing proceeding, found by a preponderance of the
evidence that Booker was also in possession of an additional 566
grams of crack cocaine and guilty of obstructing justice, mandating a
sentence of 360 months to life.70  Booker received a thirty-year
sentence.71
58. Id. at 412.
59. Id. at 367.
60. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(a)–(b) (2006)).
61. The sentence must also be less than a life sentence.  18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2006).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).
66. Id. § 3553(c) (Supp. 2011).
67. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2004).
68. Id. at 226–27.
69. Id. at 227.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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It is “unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the
assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to
which a criminal defendant is exposed,” and “such facts must be estab-
lished by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”72  The only exceptions are
prior convictions or facts admitted by the defendant.73  If the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines were simply advisory, the Sixth Amendment would not
be involved.74  Judges have wide discretion to apply a sentence within
the range outlined by statute.75  Defendants do not have a right to a
jury for the finding of facts considered by the judge when delivering a
sentence within the statutory range.76
The Court struck down the Sentencing Guidelines as unconstitu-
tional because they required judges, rather than juries, to engage in
an assessment of facts, potentially increasing the maximum penalty
available.77  To remedy this, the Court severed the mandatory provi-
sions, making the Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than
mandatory.78  Even without the mandatory provision, the Act still re-
quires judges to take account of the Guidelines.79
The Sentencing Guidelines have varied in their application since
their implementation.  However, the Act’s overall effects have been
lasting.  Most significantly, the Act has increased uniformity in sen-
tencing80 and placed an emphasis on not using imprisonment as a ve-
hicle for rehabilitation,81 although it is still a major goal of
sentencing.82
C. Summary of Relevant Sections of the Sentencing
Guidelines
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3553
Section 3553 of the Sentencing Act outlines the factors to be taken
into account for all federal sentencing.83  In general, the court should
follow the Guidelines’ recommended type of sentence and range for the
type of offense and defendant, unless there is a circumstance not ac-
72. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (quoting Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 252–53 (1999)).
73. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
74. See id. at 249–51.
75. Id. at 233.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 249–51.
78. Id. at 222.
79. Id. at 224.
80. Id. at 253.
81. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989) (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at
38, 47–48, 65 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221, 3230–31, 3248).
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2006).
83. Id. § 3553 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
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counted for by the Commission justifying a deviation.84  To supple-
ment the Guidelines’ recommendation, courts should consider the
following factors: “the nature and circumstances of the offense,”85 “the
history and characteristics of the defendant,”86 “the kinds of sentences
available,”87 any policy statements issued by the Commission ger-
mane to the situation,88 “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence dis-
parities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar conduct,”89 “the need to provide restitution to any vic-
tims of the offense,”90 and finally, that the sentence imposed symbol-
ize the four common justifications for punishment91: retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.92
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582–83
Section 3582 directs the court, when imposing a sentence of impris-
onment and determining its length, to take into account the factors in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “to the extent that they are applicable, recognizing
that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correc-
tion and rehabilitation.”93  Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 994 outlines the du-
ties of the Sentencing Commission, instructing them to “insure that
the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to
a term of imprisonment for the purposes of rehabilitating the defen-
dant or providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.”94
Section 3583 enables the court to include a term of supervised re-
lease after imprisonment.95  When deciding on the inclusion and
length of a term of supervised release, the court is to consider most of
the factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): the Sentencing Guidelines’ rec-
ommendations or policy statements; characteristics of the offense and
defendant; the need for deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation;
avoidance of sentencing disparities between similar defendants in
similar situations; and restitution for victims.96
84. Id. § 3553(b)(1).
85. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 3553(a)(3).
88. Id. § 3553(a)(5).
89. Id. § 3553(a)(6).
90. Id. § 3553(a)(7).
91. See supra section II.A for a discussion of these models.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D).
93. Id. § 3582(a).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 944(k) (2006).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a).
96. Id. § 3583(c).
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3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3562, 3572
Section 3562 directs the court to consider all of the factors from 18
U.S.C. § 3553, “to the extent that they are applicable,” when consider-
ing a term of probation and its conditions.97  Section 3572 applies
when the court is considering the imposition of a fine.98  In addition to
the factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553, the court is to consider the financial
resources and the effect of the fine on the defendant and others.99
D. The Prior Circuit Split
Prior to Tapia v. United States,100 the U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion that resolved the circuit split, the Second, Third, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeal held that 18 U.S.C. § 3582 prohibited
any consideration of rehabilitation when imposing a sentence of im-
prisonment, including when determining an appropriate length.101
On the contrary, the Eighth, Ninth,102 and Tenth Circuits103 held
that a court may not consider rehabilitative factors when determining
whether to impose a term of imprisonment, but once imposed, the
court may consider rehabilitative factors to determine the length of
the sentence.104  The Ninth Circuit reasoned if that were not Con-
gress’s intent, “it could have enacted a statute that admonished judges
to recognize ‘that imprisonment or the length of imprisonment is not
an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.’”105
United States v. Limon106 articulates the Tenth Circuit position
prior to Tapia v. United States.107  It is also generally representative
of the prior Eighth and Ninth Circuit positions.108  In Limon, the de-
fendant pled guilty to three charges of armed bank robbery and one
count of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence.109  The ap-
plicable Sentencing Guidelines range for the robbery convictions was
188 to 235 months, with an additional eighty-four months for the fire-
arm conviction.110
97. Id. § 3562(a).
98. Id. § 3572(a).
99. Id.
100. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011).
101. United States v. Story, 635 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2011).
102. Id. at 1245–46.
103. United States v. Limon, 273 F. App’x 698 (10th Cir. 2008), abrogated by United
States v. Story, 635 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2011).
104. See Story, 635 F.3d at 1245–46.
105. Id. at 1246 (quoting United States v. Duran, 37 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1994)).
106. Limon, 273 F. App’x 698.
107. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011).
108. See generally Tapia v. United States, 376 F. App’x 707 (9th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Holmes, 283 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2002).
109. Limon, 273 F. App’x at 699.
110. Id. at 701.
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The probation officer’s presentence report included information
about the defendant’s extensive criminal record and history of mental
illness, including depression, substance abuse, and bipolar disor-
der.111  The report also documented Limon’s tendency to discontinue
his psychotropic medications when unmonitored, despite their effec-
tiveness.112  The probation officer recommended the full sentence of
319 months, minus the seventy-nine month decrease recommended by
the government for the defendant’s cooperation, for a total of 240
months.113  The judge agreed but then delivered a sentence of 279
months, justifying the additional months to provide for “the safety of
the community and provision of medical care for Mr. Limon.”114
Limon appealed his sentence as unreasonable because it had been
extended in reliance on his need for mental health treatment, which
he claimed was prohibited under § 3582(a) as rehabilitative.115  The
Tenth Circuit held the prohibition of rehabilitative considerations out-
lined in § 3582(a) and § 994(k) applied solely when a court is deciding
to impose a term of imprisonment.116  The court reasoned the prohibi-
tions were meant to prevent terms of imprisonment from being given
exclusively for rehabilitative purposes.117  In Limon, the court did not
consider rehabilitative factors in the imposition of the sentence, but
only in determining its length.118  The increase in length was not only
to provide medical care, but also to ensure the safety of the commu-
nity.119  Therefore, the prohibitions against considering rehabilitative
factors did not apply to the facts presented in Limon.120  The court
upheld the sentence as statutorily permissible.121
United States v. Story122 abrogated United States v. Limon123 and
demonstrates the Tenth Circuit’s reversal to align itself with the Sec-
ond, Third, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.124  The defendant, Amber
Story, pled guilty to unlawful possession of stolen mail.125  She regu-
larly stole mail and looked for checks, which an accomplice would alter
so Story could then cash them and obtain drugs.126  The Sentencing
111. Id. at 701–02.
112. Id. at 702.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 704.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 708.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 708–09.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 700.
122. United States v. Story, 635 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2011).
123. Limon, 273 F. App’x 698.
124. Story, 635 F.3d at 1245.
125. Id. at 1243.
126. Id.
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Guidelines specified a term of twelve to eighteen months imprison-
ment and the presentence report gave no grounds for a deviation.127
The district court sentenced her to twenty-four months, arguing it
“was necessary to make her eligible for a residential drug abuse pro-
gram available only for prisoners with sentences in excess of 24
months.”128  The court cited her addiction-related criminal record as
the most persuasive factor for the deviation, asserting it was impera-
tive she receive drug treatment in the controlled confines of a correc-
tional setting.129  Story objected to the longer sentence because the
court could not ensure her participation in the program.130  The pro-
gram availability varied by facility and prison administration officials
determined placement.131  She was most likely not eligible since she
had outstanding warrants.132
The appellate court used an argument from the D.C. Circuit to re-
ject the distinction between the decision to imprison a defendant and
the decision of how long to imprison a defendant: “If . . . imprisonment
is not an appropriate means of promoting rehabilitation, how can
more imprisonment serve as an appropriate means of promoting reha-
bilitation?”133  Furthermore, the court rejected the reasoning of the
Ninth Circuit that Congress should have included the phrase “or
length of imprisonment” to prohibit consideration of rehabilitative
goals equally for the imposition of the term itself and the length of the
term: “[T]he phrase ‘or the length of imprisonment’ [would not] add
anything that the term ‘imprisonment’ on its own doesn’t already con-
vey . . . .  A sentencing court deciding to keep a defendant locked up for
an additional month is, as to that month, in fact choosing imprison-
ment over release.”134
Finally, the Story court recognized that permitting judges to make
sentencing decisions based on the hopeful placement of the defendant
in a prison-based program was imprudent.135  While the court ulti-
mately held the sentence was based on statutory error,136 it also held
the error was not plain, as the circuits were split on the issue, and
previous Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals137 cases actually held the
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1243–44.
130. Id. at 1244.
131. Id. at 1245.
132. Id. at 1244.
133. Id. at 1246 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 573 F. 3d 844, 849–51 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
134. Id. at 1247 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 573 F. 3d 844,
849–51 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
135. Id. (citing United States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152, 158 (3rd Cir. 2007)).
136. Id. at 1248.
137. See generally United States v. Limon, 273 F. App’x 698 (10th Cir. 2008), abro-
gated by United States v. Story, 635 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2011).
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contrary.138  The defendant’s sentence was not vacated, and the judg-
ment of the district court was affirmed.139
In a brief concurring opinion, Judge Hartz acknowledged signifi-
cant overlap between the goals of rehabilitation and incapacitation.140
Section § 3553(a)(2)(c) lists one of the factors to be considered in im-
posing a sentence as the need “to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant,”141 a value recognized as incapacitation.142
Judge Hartz asserted the longer sentence was most likely justifiable
under § 3582 by reducing the threat of recidivism.143  If the defendant
were placed in the rehabilitative program, her chances of recidivism
would be reduced, and if not, the longer sentence would protect the
public from her recidivism a little longer.144
III. INTEGRATING 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3582 IN TAPIA V.
UNITED STATES
In Tapia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Reform
Act bars federal courts from considering rehabilitative factors when
imposing a term of imprisonment or determining its length.145  The
defendant, Alejandra Tapia, was convicted of smuggling unauthorized
aliens into the country.146  Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Tapia
was subject to a term of imprisonment between forty-one and fifty-one
months.147  The court sentenced Tapia to a fifty-one month term with
three years of supervised release.148  The district court stated the
“number one” reason for the longer sentence was to make Tapia eligi-
ble for a drug treatment program.149  On appeal, the defendant
averred her sentence violated § 3582(a), but the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld her sentence.150  The U.S. Supreme Court, however,
reversed the lower courts’ decisions.151
The Court began by recounting the history preceding the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984 to establish congressional intent for the Act
overall.152  Prior to the Act, the system of indeterminate sentencing
138. Story, 635 F.3d at 1248–49.
139. Id. at 1249.
140. See id. (Hartz, J., concurring).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(c) (2006).
142. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (2011).
143. Story, 635 F.3d at 1249 (Hartz, J., concurring).
144. Id.
145. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2385.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. United States v. Tapia, 376 F. App’x. 707 (9th Cir. 2010).
151. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2386.
152. Id. at 2386–87 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)).
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emphasized rehabilitation of the offender, predicating release on
prison officials’ determination of rehabilitation.153  According to the
Court, the purpose of the Act was to deemphasize rehabilitation and
limit judges’ discretion, thereby reducing sentence disparities and
eliminating a failed system of sentencing.154
The Court’s second point was based on the structure of the Act.155
Several sections of the Act refer back to § 3553(a)(2) defining objec-
tives to be considered for different types of sentences.156  For example,
courts are undisputedly not permitted to consider retributivistic moti-
vations for a term of supervised release.157  The prohibition of
§ 3582(a) also mirrors a section in the enabling statute of the Sentenc-
ing Commission requiring judges “insure that the guidelines reflect
the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprison-
ment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant.”158
The Court also recognized that no section of the Guidelines gave
courts the authority to assign prisoners to rehabilitative programs or
specific prison facilities.159  However, a court can gauge the rehabili-
tative need of an offender for probation or supervised release,160 and
Congress gave them authority to mandate participation in rehabilita-
tive programs within those types of sentences.161  This is the opposite
of how participation in rehabilitative programs in prison is deter-
mined.162  A sentencing court can make a recommendation, but the
Bureau of Prisons has the discretion to administer all inmate place-
ments and programs.163
Next, the Court focused on the text of the Act.164  Section 3582(a)
requires courts to “recognize” imprisonment as not “appropriate” for
rehabilitative purposes.165  “Recognize” is generally accepted to mean
“to acknowledge or treat as valid,” and “appropriate” is “suitable or
fitting for a particular purpose.”166  Combined, this indicates courts
“should acknowledge that imprisonment is not suitable for the pur-
pose of promoting rehabilitation.”167  While the Court agreed Con-
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2387.
155. Id. at 2387–88.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2388 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (2006)).
158. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2006)).
159. Id. at 2390.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2390–91 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2006)).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2388.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2006).
166. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2388 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1611 (Stuart Berg Flexner & Leonore Crary Hauck eds., 2d ed. 1987)).
167. Id.
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gress could have used stronger language in this prohibition, the Court
asserted none of the alternative meanings of “recognize” differ enough
to allow a reasonable doubt as to congressional intent.168
The Court also addressed the distinction between the decision to
imprison and the decision of the length of imprisonment by referring
to the definition of imprisonment: “the state of being imprisoned.”169
Since the definition applies both to an original confinement and its
prolongation, the Court saw no reason to differentiate between the de-
cisions to apply different goals.170
Finally, the Court looked to the Senate Report of the Sentencing
Reform Act to investigate how the legislative history could clarify con-
gressional intent specific to these sections.171  While the report explic-
itly noted Congress’s skepticism toward prison-based
rehabilitation,172 it still stopped short of completely eliminating reha-
bilitation as a purpose of sentencing by only restricting rehabilitation
to sentences other than imprisonment.173  Since the district court de-
cided Tapia’s sentence considered rehabilitative goals and “a court
may not impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to
complete a treatment program or otherwise promote rehabilitation,”
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment.174
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT RESOLUTION
The Court’s decision in Tapia v. United States175 demonstrated the
correct integration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and 18 U.S.C. § 3582 by inter-
preting the Act in congruence with Congress’s obvious intentions.
However, the Court could have gone even further and bolstered its
decision through consideration of the policy implications.  The Court
commonly considers factual policy outcomes to both elucidate intricate
legal issues and to ensure its decisions benefit the public.176
168. Id. at 2388–89.
169. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1137 (Philip Bab-
cock Gove et al. eds., 3d ed. 1993)).
170. Id. at 2389–90.
171. Id. at 2391 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182).
172. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3221).
173. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 76–77 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3259–60).
174. Id. at 2393.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (deciding the legal issue
whether segregation violated the 14th Amendment after considering the emo-
tional, psychological, and mental impact of segregation; overruling Plessy v. Fer-
guson as against public interest and unconstitutional); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896).
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While Tapia ostensibly should be read as an impediment to the
rehabilitationist agenda, this Part will demonstrate that the factual
policy outcomes from Tapia are consistent with rehabilitationist goals.
Tapia not only affirmed that rehabilitation is appropriately consid-
ered for sentences other than imprisonment, it also placed rehabilita-
tive prison programs firmly in the authority of prison administrative
personnel, not judges.  Prison is not inherently rehabilitative, and
judges have no authority to incorporate rehabilitative programs into
an inmate’s imprisonment.  Finally, as the statutory interpretation in-
volved in Tapia was a simple legal analysis, this Part will primarily
analyze factual evidence of the public policy outcomes to augment the
assertion that Tapia should be read as an excellent opportunity to
refocus on evidence-based rehabilitative options.
A. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Interpretation Is Consistent
with Congressional Intent
Utilizing foundational methods of interpretation, the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s holding in Tapia v. United States177 was correct.  The
overall purpose of the legislation, congressional intent specific to 18
U.S.C. § 3582, statutory text, and the structure of the statute all sup-
port the holding.  The Court laid out a comprehensive explanation of
the holding employing each of these principles.178  Legislative intent
is very clear in the Senate Report of the Sentencing Reform Act,179
and the plain meaning of the statute’s text does not allow for reasona-
ble ambiguity.180  Both the history of the sentencing system and the
structure of other sections referring back to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) are
consistent with this interpretation.181
While the application of the statute in Tapia was technically cor-
rect, Judge Hartz draws attention to a possible loophole in his concur-
ring opinion in Story.182  True rehabilitation will necessarily reduce
recidivism, and by this mechanism, “protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant.”183  “Protect[ing] the public from further
crimes” is actually the statutory definition of incapacitation, which is
a permissible purpose for a sentence of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582.184  Judge Hartz seems to be elucidating the overlap between
incapacitation and rehabilitation, as they both keep the public safe
from future crimes.  It is possible Judge Hartz’s reasoning could be
177. See Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2382.
178. See supra section III.
179. S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
180. See supra section III.
181. See supra section III.
182. United States v. Story, 635 F.3d 1241, 1249 (2011) (Hartz, J., concurring).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(c) (2006).
184. Id.
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applied in the future to collapse the analysis of this issue to only the
wording used by the sentencing judge.
B. Rehabilitation Is Appropriately Considered in
Sentencing Other Than Imprisonment
Despite the exclusion of rehabilitative motivations for imprison-
ment, rehabilitation has remained an important overall goal of sen-
tencing.  The Senate Report accompanying the Sentencing Reform Act
outlined Congress’s deliberate preservation of rehabilitation in certain
contexts.185  Instead of eliminating it entirely, as urged by some crit-
ics,186 Congress chose to “retain[ ] rehabilitation and corrections as an
appropriate purpose of a sentence, while recognizing, in light of cur-
rent knowledge, that ‘imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting correction and rehabilitation.’”187
18 U.S.C. § 3583 directs courts, when including a term of super-
vised release after a prison sentence, to consider the Sentencing
Guidelines’ recommendations or policy statements, characteristics of
the offense and of the defendant, the need for deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and rehabilitation, avoidance of sentencing disparities between
similar defendants in similar situations, and restitution for vic-
tims.188  Unlike § 3582, which addresses sentencing of imprisonment,
rehabilitation is included and retributivistic goals are omitted.189  The
imposing of a fine190 or probation191 are two rare areas where all fac-
tors from § 3553 can be considered.
Considering rehabilitative factors for sentences of a fine, proba-
tion, or a term of supervised release are all the correct application of
the law and good policy.  When appropriate and available, judges can
pick evidence-based rehabilitation courts or problem-solving courts192
over imprisonment or other sanctions.  As of 2004, there were more
185. S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
186. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2391 (2011).
187. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 76 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3259 (em-
phasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2006)).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (2006).
189. Id. §§ 3582–3583 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
190. Id. § 3572.
191. Id. § 3562.
192. The term “problem-solving courts” is generally defined as those courts addressing
specific crimes with high recidivism rates that also have specific treatment op-
tions available, such as drug- and alcohol-related crimes.  The premise of these
courts is to reduce recidivism by treating the underlying problem with evidence-
based treatments through collaboration between attorneys, judges, defendants,
and treatment professionals. See Problem Solving Courts, Minn. Jud. Branch,
http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=626 (last visited Aug. 6, 2013).
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than 2,500 problem-solving courts in the United States.193  More than
ten years ago, the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of
State Court Administrators passed a resolution encouraging the use of
problem-solving courts.194  The support and funding for these courts
continues to grow around the country.195
An initial justification for these alternative courts is they simply
work better: they reduce recidivism rates, and the criminal justice sys-
tems work more effectively.  Drug courts are the most cited, as they
are the oldest form of alternative court and have the most data availa-
ble.196  While comprehensive drug court data on a national level is not
yet available, individual states and funding sources often evaluate
their own programs.197  American University compiled data from
these sources.198  It demonstrated a consistent reduction in recidivism
and costs associated with imprisonment, leading to a reduction in
overall costs, despite increased treatment costs.199
For example, offenders from the Circuit Court in Maryland who
participated in drug court, as opposed to those processed normally,
had 44% fewer arrests overall, with 62% fewer drug arrests, 72%
fewer property arrests, and 70% fewer arrests for crimes against per-
sons, for a total of more than $10.2 million dollars saved over a three-
year period.200  In California, over 1,900 participants in seventeen
193. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2007 41 (Carol
R. Flango et al eds., 2007), available at http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/sin
gleitem/collection/ctadmin/id/980/rec/19.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 50.  The first drug court was in Miami in 1989, started collaboratively by
Deputy Chief Judge Herbert Klein under the instructions of Chief Judge Gerald
Wetherington and with the guidance of Dr. Michael Smith, director of the Sub-
stance Abuse Clinic at Lincoln Hospital. Id.
197. Id. at 52 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE,
AM. UNIV., RECIDIVISM AND OTHER FINDINGS REPORTED IN SELECTED EVALUATION
REPORTS OF ADULT DRUG COURT PROGRAMS PUBLISHED: 2000–PRESENT (2010)).
198. Id. (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, AM.
UNIV., RECIDIVISM AND OTHER FINDINGS REPORTED IN SELECTED EVALUATION RE-
PORTS OF ADULT DRUG COURT PROGRAMS PUBLISHED: 2000–PRESENT (2010)).
199. Id. (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, AM.
UNIV., RECIDIVISM AND OTHER FINDINGS REPORTED IN SELECTED EVALUATION RE-
PORTS OF ADULT DRUG COURT PROGRAMS PUBLISHED: 2000–PRESENT (2010)).
200. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, AM. UNIV., RE-
CIDIVISM AND OTHER FINDINGS REPORTED IN SELECTED EVALUATION REPORTS OF
ADULT DRUG COURT PROGRAMS PUBLISHED: 2000–PRESENT, at 1, 31, 71 (2010).
Study four includes criminal justice system costs and victimization costs, based
on costs incurred by the comparison group of offenders not participating in drug
court. Id. The number given is for participants not in the Circuit Court; Circuit
Court participants had a lower re-arrest rate, and therefore higher savings, on
every measure. Id. The study synopsis does not specify if participants were ran-
domly assigned to participate in the alternative court; for those concerned about
a self-selection bias among participants, please see the data from the next study,
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counties completed drug court, reducing their arrest rate for the next
two years by 85% in comparison to their arrest rate for the two years
before admission into drug court, resulting in approximately $61 mil-
lion avoided costs statewide per year.201  In Virginia, researchers com-
pared felony arrest rates for those who completed drug court, those
who did not graduate, and those who were processed traditionally.202
The rates were 16%, 33%, and 50%, respectively.203
While those statistics may not be sufficient to convince every critic,
often the immediate economic efficiency of these courts can influence
some.  On average, an offender participating in drug court costs more
in treatment but substantially less in jail and probation time, costing
about $1,400 or 80% of an offender processed normally.204  Including
prevented recidivism, the savings extend to $6,744, and with pre-
vented victimization costs, the total averages to $12,218 per
offender.205
Drug courts are not the only alternative courts seeing success.  As
these alternative courts grew in popularity, innovative leaders gener-
alized the principles to other issues linked to high recidivism rates or
particularly vulnerable populations: intimate partner violence, tru-
ancy, mental health, homelessness, prostitution,206 and veterans.207
Graduates from a mental health court in San Francisco had a 39%
reduction in overall recidivism and a 54% reduction of violent
which utilized a within-groups, repeated measures design (instead of comparing
two different groups, participants are compared in before and after conditions).
Id. at 71.
201. See id. at 5, 33, 75.  Study sixteen found “avoided criminal justice costs averaged
approximately $200,000 annually per court for each 100 participants; with 90
adult drug courts operating statewide as of 2002, and drug court caseloads con-
servatively estimated at 100 participants per year, annual statewide cost savings
for adult drug courts suggested by data to be $18 million per year; cost offset and
cost avoidance estimated at $43 million predominately due to avoided jail and
prison costs.” Id. at 75.
202. See id. at 8, 37, 79.  In study twenty-nine, participants were “chronic offenders
prior to drug court entry; averaging 6.8 felony arrests and 5.6 misdemeanor ar-
rests.” Id. at 79.
203. See id. at 8, 37, 79.
204. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 193, at 5 (citing MICHAEL W. FINIGAN,
SHANNON M. CAREY & ANTON COX, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF A MA-
TURE DRUG COURT OVER 10 YEARS OF OPERATION: RECIDIVISM AND COSTS 44
(2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219225.pdf).
205. MICHAEL W. FINIGAN, SHANNON M. CAREY & ANTON COX, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE,
THE IMPACT OF A MATURE DRUG COURT OVER 10 YEARS OF OPERATION: RECIDIVISM
AND COSTS, at IV (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219225.pdf.
206. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 193, at 42.
207. Leave No Veteran Behind, ECONOMIST, June 2, 2011, http://www.economist.com/
node/18775315 (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
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charges.208  In North Carolina, mental health court graduates recidi-
vated half as often as their normally processed counterparts.209  In
Washington, participants’ number of arrests during the year after en-
tering mental health court dropped to lower than a quarter of their
arrests in the year prior, and they were rearrested for probation viola-
tions 62% less often.210
Despite the success of these problem-solving courts, critics still
have concerns about these rehabilitative alternatives.  They assert
that these courts are not concerned with guilt or innocence, allow for
judges to impose their own values on defendants, and will result in
unfair variability between sentences.211  These concerns can be ad-
dressed by implementing best practices.  The first can be addressed
with a post-conviction model rather than a diversionary model.212
Waiting until sentencing, after a defendant has passed the plea or
trial stage, to incorporate alternatives limits due process concerns, as
participants are then probationers rather than criminal defend-
ants.213  Ensuring fidelity to treatment through the use of manuals
outlining specific steps to graduation, evidence-based treatment proto-
cols, and a clear understanding of what constitutes success in the pro-
gram will limit variability and opportunities for judges to impose their
own values on defendants.
Currently, these alternative programs address only certain types
of crimes.  Expanding the programs to allow participation by defend-
ants who were not convicted of the specific crime, but whose criminal-
ity is driven by similar issues, would permit a more comprehensive
effect.  An individual convicted of stealing, a behavior he or she en-
gaged in to support an addiction, would benefit from a drug court pro-
gram in the same way as an individual convicted of possession of a
controlled substance.
Limon was convicted of bank robbery and weapons charges, Story
was convicted of unlawful possession of stolen mail,214 and Tapia was
208. Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, Effectiveness of a Mental Health Court in
Reducing Criminal Recidivism and Violence, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1395, 1401
(2007).
209. LAUREN ALMQUIST & ELIZABETH DODD, JUSTICE CTR., MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A
GUIDE TO RESEARCH-INFORMED POLICY AND PRACTICE 23 (2009), https://www.
bja.gov/Publications/CSG_MHC_Research.pdf.
210. Id. at 24.  Currently, there is not enough data to definitively calculate costs or
savings of the programs. Id. at 26.
211. Leslie Eaton & Leslie Kaufman, In Problem-Solving Court, Judges Turn Thera-
pist, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/26/nyregion/
26courts.html?_r=2&.
212. Brenda Bratton Blom, Julie Galbo-Moyes & Robin Jacobs, Community Voice and
Justice: An Essay on Problem-Solving Courts as a Proxy for Change, 10 U. MD. L.
J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 25, 37–38 (2010).
213. Id. at 38.
214. For further discussion of these convictions, see section II.D.
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convicted of smuggling unauthorized aliens into the country.215  In
these landmark cases surrounding 18 U.S.C. § 3582,216 none of the
defendants were convicted of crimes typically allowed into a problem-
solving court.  The alternative courts are showing success, but they
are currently only available to a subset of the population that would
benefit from the services provided.  Broadening the inclusion criterion
would allow these evidence-based alternatives opportunity for further
impact.
18 U.S.C. § 3572 allows for rehabilitative factors, inter alia, to be
considered in the imposition of a fine.217  An excellent example of this
is the emergence of the restorative justice approach to offender reha-
bilitation.  While there is much more to the process of mediation and
collaboration used in restorative justice,218 one common element—
found in more than 75% of participant agreements—is requiring of-
fenders to pay restitution.219  Early research did not show significant
results, reaching only slightly lower rates of recidivism for partici-
pants.220  However, as the field has grown and researchers have been
able to identify variables limiting success,221 there has been a swell of
evidence showing lowered recidivism rates.222
Although judges may not consider rehabilitative factors when im-
posing a prison sentence, this is permissible for all other sanctions.
Judges can reduce the likelihood an offender will one day necessitate a
prison sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines by choosing rehabili-
tative and evidence-based alternatives.  Finally, the first drug court
215. For further discussion of this conviction, see Part III.
216. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2006).
217. Id. § 3572.
218. See generally Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: A Social Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251
(2005).
219. Nancy Rodriguez, Restorative Justice at Work: Examining the Impact of Restora-
tive Justice Resolutions on Juvenile Recidivism, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 355, 362
(2007).
220. Id. at 359 (citing Mike Niemeyer & David Shichor, A Preliminary Study of a
Large Victim/Offender Reconciliation Program, 60 FED. PROBATION 30 (1996);
Mark S. Umbreit, Crime Victims Confront Their Offenders: The Impact of a Min-
neapolis Mediation Program, 4 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 436 (1994); Mark S.
Umbreit & Robert B. Coates, Cross-site Analysis of Victim-Offender Mediation in
Four States, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 565 (1993)).
221. Id. at 359–61.
222. Id. at 359 (citing Hennessey Hayes & Kathleen Daly, Youth Justice Conferencing
and Reoffending, 20 JUST. Q. 725 (2003); Gabrielle Maxwell & Allison Morris,
Victim Participation in Sentencing: The Problems of Incoherence, 40 HOWARD J.
OF CRIM. JUST. 39 (2001); William R. Nugent, Mark S. Umbreit, Lizabeth Wi-
inamaki & Jeff Paddock, Participation in Victim-Offender Mediation and Reof-
fense: Successful Replications?, 11 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 9 (2001); Jeff
Latimer, Craig Dowden & Danielle Muise, The Effectiveness of Restorative Justice
Practices: A Meta-Analysis, 85 PRISON J. 127 (2005)).
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was not founded until five years after the Sentencing Reform Act.223
All of the research supporting alternative courts has been compiled in
the last twenty-four years.  The scientific knowledge available con-
cerning rehabilitation and human behavior in the criminal justice sys-
tem has grown exponentially since this legislation was passed.224
C. There Is a Place for Rehabilitation in Prison After Tapia
“[A]lmost everyone involved in the criminal justice system now
doubts that rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a prison setting,
and it is now quite certain that no one can really detect whether or
when a prisoner is rehabilitated.”225  Congress may have been correct
on both points in 1984, but available scientific knowledge has grown to
challenge those misperceptions.
Determining the rehabilitation of prisoners with reasonable accu-
racy is not impossible.  A meta-analysis226 of 131 studies suggests
that amalgamating static, unchangeable risk factors, such as age and
criminal history, with dynamic, changing risk factors, such as gang-
affiliation and rehabilitation-program involvement, significantly in-
creases risk prediction accuracy.227  Since dynamic risk factors change
with the offender’s environment,228 predicting recidivism will never
be completely accurate, but current accuracy levels are approximately
70%.229  Using actuarial recidivism prediction instruments, instead of
human judgment, also increases accuracy.230
Not only can rehabilitation be measured on a limited scale, but it
can also be reliably induced in prison.  Recently, and over the past ten
years in particular, there has been a growing accumulation of re-
search linking some interventions to lower recidivism rates.231  Spe-
223. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
224. See also section IV.C (presenting further research about rehabilitation and
human behavior in the criminal justice system that has been published since the
Sentencing Reform Act).
225. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221.
226. A meta-analysis is a statistical combination of the results from multiple studies
to provide a more comprehensive assessment of the outcomes in that area of re-
search. See Paul Gendreau, Tracy Little & Claire Goggin, A Meta-Analysis of the
Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What Works!, 34 Criminology 575,
579–81 (1996).
227. PETERSILIA, supra note 24, at 190 (citing Paul Gendreau, Tracy Little & Claire R
Goggin, A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What
Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575 (1996)).
228. Dynamic risk factors include family support, environment, and interpersonal re-
lationships, among others. See Gendreau, supra note 226, at 575–77.
229. PETERSILIA, supra note 24, at 190–91. R
230. Id.
231. Mark E. Olver, Keira C. Stockdale & J. Stephen Wormith, A Meta-Analysis of
Predictors of Offender Treatment Attrition and Its Relationship to Recidividism,
79 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 6, 6–7 (2011).
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cifically, the Risk-Need-Responsivity model has been linked to larger
reductions in recidivism.232  This model emphasizes three characteris-
tics of treatment: treatment intensity should be matched to the risk
level of the offender, treatment should focus on factors linked to crimi-
nal behavior, and treatment should be tailored to the personality and
capability of the offender.233  A series of meta-analyses has linked the
use of this model to recidivism reduction for general,234 violent,235
sexual,236 and intimate partner violence crimes.237
Parole boards could utilize guidelines based on this research to re-
main focused on more accurate predictive factors, like recidivism risk
and offense severity.238  The guidelines would also lower the subjec-
tive elements of release decision-making that can cause large sentenc-
ing disparities and a coercive environment.239  Furthermore,
measuring rehabilitation by recidivism risk reduction would limit the
subjective variability between parole boards.  Parole board members
have less opportunity to impose personal values on the offender if de-
cisions are based on empirical factors predicting the offender’s likeli-
hood to comply with society’s values, as reflected by our laws.
To further ensure objectivity and to reduce political pressure, pa-
role board members should be trained correctional professionals
rather than politically appointed individuals.240  In most states still
using parole boards, the governor appoints parole board members.241
232. Id. at 6 (citing D. A. Andrews & James Bonta, Rehabilitating Criminal Justice
Policy and Practice, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 39 (2010)).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 7 (citing D. A. Andrews & James Bonta, Rehabilitating Criminal Justice
Policy and Practice, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 39 (2010); D. A. Andrews &
Craig Dowden, Risk Principle of Case Classification in Correctional Treatment: A
Meta-Analytic Investigation, 50 INT’L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMI-
NOLOGY 88 (2006); D. A. Andrews, James Bonta & R. D. Hoge, Classification for
Effective Rehabilitation: Rediscovering Psychology, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19
(1990); Nana A. Landenberger & Mark W. Lipsey, The Positive Effects of Cogni-
tive-Behavioral Programs for Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of Factors Associated
with Effective Treatment, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 451 (2005); Mark W.
Lipsey, The Effect of Treatment on Juvenile Delinquents: Results from Meta-Anal-
ysis, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 131 (Friedrich Losel
et al. eds., 1992)).
235. Id. (citing Craig Dowden & D. A. Andrews, Effective Correctional Treatment and
Violent Reoffending: A Meta-Analysis, 42 CAN. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 449 (2000)).
236. Id. (citing R. Karl Hanson, Guy Bourgon, Leslie Helmus & Shannon Hodgson,
The Principles of Effective Correctional Treatment Also Apply to Sexual Offenders:
A Meta-Analysis, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 865 (2009)).
237. Id. (citing Julia C. Babcock, Charles E. Green & Chet Robie, Does Batterers’
Treatment Work? A Meta-Analytic Review of Domestic Violence Treatment, 23
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 1023 (2004)).
238. PETERSILIA, supra note 24, at 189. R
239. Id.
240. Id. at 191.
241. Id.
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Two-thirds of the states have no professional qualification
requirements.242
Rehabilitative goals should be a factor in sentencing a term of im-
prisonment, not by judges on the initial end, but by parole boards con-
sidering the release date of an offender.  Not only are Congress’s
original concerns about accuracy reduced—this would also not be a
regression to the days of unregulated parole board control subjecting
inmates to members’ personal opinions and leaving sentences unfairly
variable and unpredictable.243  With parole boards eradicated in six-
teen states244 and the federal prison system,245 approximately 60% of
inmates will not appear before a parole board prior to release.246
While eliminating parole boards ostensibly seems like a way to punish
more harshly, in actuality, this creates a situation where offenders are
released back to the community with no requirements, support, or
regulation.247
It is less likely prisoners will participate in self-improvement pro-
grams while in prison if they have no tangible motivation for doing
so.248  Unprepared, prisoners are struggling with success upon reen-
try.  Within three years of release, approximately two-thirds are re-
arrested for at least one serious crime, almost half are convicted, and
a quarter return to prison with a new sentence.249  Of those who were
re-arrested within three years, half were re-arrested within six
months and two-thirds within the first year.250  Including parole vio-
lations, 52% returned to prison within three years.251
Data from 1994 shows an increase of about 5% in the overall re-
arrest rate compared to data from 1983.252  However, the general
“two-thirds re-arrest rate” has been consistent since 1969.253  New ar-
rests now happen not only slightly more often, but sooner: in 1983,
about one in four were re-arrested within six months, but in 1994, this
ratio had grown to almost one in three.254  Being young, African-
242. Id.
243. Id. at 188.
244. Id. at 187.
245. See supra section II.B.
246. PETERSILIA, supra note 24, at 188–89. R
247. Id.
248. Id. at 188.
249. Id. at 140–41.  Within three years of release 67.5% are re-arrested, 46.9% are
convicted, and 25.4% return to prison with a new sentence. Id. (citing PATRICK A.
LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISON-
ERS RELEASED IN 1994, 1 (2002) [hereinafter LANGAN]).
250. See id. at 141 (citing LANGAN, supra note 249).
251. Id. at 140 (citing LANGAN, supra note 249).
252. Id. at 143 (citing LANGAN, supra note 249).
253. Id. at 141.
254. Id. at 143 (citing LANGAN, supra note 249).
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American, or male was linked to a higher likelihood of recidivism, but
interestingly, time served in prison was not.255
Prisoners have higher prevalence rates for physical and mental im-
pairments than the general population, which likely accounts for some
of their difficulties reintegrating into society after release.256  Fur-
thermore, “persons with mental illness are increasingly criminalized
and processed through the corrections system instead of the mental
health system.”257  Deinstitutionalization was a well-intentioned na-
tional change in mental health policy that shifted the primary care of
individuals with serious mental illness from psychiatric hospitals to
community-based treatment.258  Unfortunately, access to community
services lagged behind demand for services, due in large part to lim-
ited resources, leaving a disparity between the treatment available
and the treatment needed for successful community integration.259
The people caught in this gap can often end up drawing the interest of
law enforcement.260  Overall, the prison population has a much higher
prevalence of mental illness than the general population.261  This dis-
tinction is most sharply defined with substance dependence, as some
estimates put its prevalence rate as high as 72%.262
While all of this is happening within our prison population, the
population itself is significantly growing.  From the mid-1920s to the
mid-1970s, there were about 110 inmates per 100,000 American citi-
zens;263 by 2010, the number had grown to 962 inmates per
100,000.264  Ninety-three percent of all prison inmates will eventually
255. Id. at 142 (citing LANGAN, supra note 249).
256. Id. at 34–36.  Thirty-one percent of state prisoners and twenty-three percent of
federal prisoners are reported to have physical and mental impairments. Id. at
35. It is estimated these rates underrepresent actual prevalence; surveys estab-
lishing these numbers asked inmates if they had various impairments, assuming
the inmates understood what was meant by the diagnoses, had access to health
care, and had been diagnosed. Id. Twenty-one percent of all inmates report hav-
ing a disability limiting their ability to work, compared to twelve percent of the
general population. Id. at 35–36.
257. Id. at 36–37.
258. CHRIS KOYANAGI, THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., LEARNING FROM HISTORY: DEINSTI-
TUTIONALIZATION OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AS PRECURSOR TO LONG-TERM
CARE REFORM 1 (2007), available at http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section
=About_the_Issue&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&Cont
entID=137545.  The number of national residents dropped from 559,000 in 1955
to 154,000 in 1980. Id.
259. Id.
260. PETERSILIA, supra note 24, at 37. R
261. Id. at 38.  In the prison population, one in six suffer from mental illness. Id. at 3.
262. Jennifer L. Rounds-Bryant & Lattie Baker Jr., Substance Dependence and Level
of Treatment Need Among Recently-Incarcerated Prisoners, 33 THE AM. J. OF
DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 557 (2007).
263. PETERSILIA, supra note 24, at 21. R
264. GLAZE, supra note 2, at 2. R
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be released.265  Rehabilitative programs in prison are more important
than ever to help our growing prison population overcome barriers to
reintegration upon release.  Even if participation in programs is not
motivated solely by an inmate’s hopes for self-improvement, beneficial
changes can still occur.266
Rehabilitation still has an important role in prisons if we hope to
improve our national situation.  It is inappropriate for judges to make
sentencing decisions based on rehabilitative factors without control
over the inmate’s participation in these programs.  The defendants in
both Story267 and Tapia268 were never enrolled in the programs for
which their sentences were lengthened.  It is up to prison administra-
tors to make these programs available and legislatures to revitalize
parole boards to emphasize these programs.  The most important as-
pects of these programs are that they are evidence-based and subject
to program evaluation for tangible outcomes.  This focus on scientific
evaluation will increase accountability and prevent a regression to
hopeful-but-haphazard attempts at rehabilitation.
V. CONCLUSION
After Tapia,269 federal judges cannot appropriately consider reha-
bilitative factors when sentencing defendants to imprisonment under
the Sentencing Guidelines.  This outcome was not only the correct ap-
plication of the law but also a wise policy decision.  Prison is not inher-
ently rehabilitative and, while there are rehabilitative options in
prison, judges do not control the administration of these options and
should not base sentencing decisions on them.
However, rehabilitation still has a major role to play in our crimi-
nal justice system.  Judges can choose rehabilitative options instead of
imprisonment for defendants, and prison administrators can offer evi-
dence-based rehabilitation programs.  Without an emphasis on utiliz-
ing research to evidence the effectiveness of these programs, labeling
them rehabilitative is at best unsubstantiated optimism and at worst
a lie presented as a promise to victims, offenders, and the community.
Repairing parole boards to reflect advances in scientific knowledge
would help revive an emphasis on rehabilitation.
The assumption that prison was inherently rehabilitative did not
work, but neither has completely abandoning rehabilitative goals.
Never before have we housed so much of our population in prison.
Our malfunctioning prison system is a drain on our economy, our com-
265. PETERSILIA, supra note 24, at 3. R
266. Id. at 188.
267. United States v. Story, 635 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011).
268. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2391 (2011).
269. Id. at 2382.
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munities, our families, and our people.  There is no justification for
failing to offer rehabilitation that could potentially transform some-
one’s life and our communities, especially when it is more economi-
cally efficient.
The pendulum swung too far from rehabilitation during the sen-
tencing reform movement; our goal should be to create a balance be-
tween the justifications for punishment.  Incorporating rehabilitative
options does not have to be to the exclusion of incapacitation, deter-
rence, and retribution—it can serve those purposes, as well. Tapia270
should not function as an abdication of rehabilitation in our criminal
justice system but instead as an opportunity to more closely focus the
lens on evidence-based rehabilitation.
270. Id.
